

Minutes of Meeting

TF “Implementation Strategic Reserves”

28/Feb/2014

Meeting location: VBO-FEB, Rue Ravenstein 4, 1000 Brussels

Meeting date: 28 February 2014, 13h30-17h30

1. List of participants

The following persons were present at meeting of 28/2/2014:

Name	First name	Affiliation
Adams	Claude	SPF-Energie
Antoons	Eric	Parkwind
De Waal	Theo	Essent
De Waele	Bart	CREG
De Wispelaere	Bram	EDF Luminus
Debrigode	Patricia	CREG
Godt	Annemie	Electrabel
Harlem	Steven	FEPEG
Jourdain	Sigrid	SPF Energie
Massin	Bart	Electrabel
Michiels	Grégory	EDF Luminus
Mermans	Pieter-Jan	Restore
Meynckens	Geert	Ineos
Pierreux	Nicolas	Belpex
Roselli	Pasquale	ENEL
Verbruggen	Pierre	Actility
Vermeiren	Christian	T-Power
Verrydt	Eric	BASF
Verwimp	Sven	Nyrstar
Wyverkens	Herman	EON-Benelux
Spire	Emeline	Elia (President)
Buijs	Patrik	Elia (Speaker, Secretary)
Carton	Filip	Elia (Speaker, Secretary)
Tsiokanos	Anna	Elia (Speaker)
Thüngen	Carl-Stephan	Elia
De Clercq	Bernard	Elia

The following persons showed interest in the task force and are included in the direct mailing list:

Bécret	Jean-Pierre	Solvay
Breidenbaugh	Aaron	EnerNOC
Claes	Peter	Febeliec
Curvers	Daan	Cogen Vlaanderen

De Coster	Nicolas	Cabinet Wathelet
De Jonghe	Cedric	Actility
Deheegher	Tine	VOKA
Demaret	Frederik	EDF Luminus
Detollenaere	Alice	ODE
Doin	Benoit	ENEL
Endicott	Brendan	EnerNOC
Gerard	Frank	Edora
Gheury	Jacques	CREG
Gommeren	Ward	Power Alstom
Hajjam	Mehdi	Actility
Hensmans	Jan	FOD Economie
Jong	Dieter	Anode
Laumont	Noémie	Edora
Lenaerts	Stijn	Greenfever
Lhomme	Raphaël	Air Liquide
Loos	Rob	APX Endex
Matevosyan	Anna	T-Power
Nihant	Pierre	EDF Luminus
Renaud	Jeff	EnerNOC
Scholtes	Emilie	Energy Pool
Soens	Joris	Eandis
Van den Berg	Jasper	Powerhouse
Van der Maren	Olivier	VBO/FEB
Van Gijzeghem	Francies	ODE
Van Nuffel	Luc	ELECTRABEL
Vandeveld	Lut	BOP
Verbeeck	Wouter	Greenfever

2. Agenda

1. Approval of draft minutes TF ISR 17/2/2014 and practical arrangements website (10 minutes)
2. Market design (1 hour)
3. Product design (1 hour 15 minutes)
(coffee break, 20 minutes)
4. Tender design (1 hour 15 minutes)

It was indicated on the agenda that market design relates to the functioning rules. Product design relates to both the functioning rules and the procedure for constitution of strategic reserves. Tender design only relates to the latter procedure.

There was no comment on the agenda.

All participants are invited to raise all questions and comments during the presentations in order to have a fruitful discussion. Participants were also reminded and encouraged that they can provide reactions in writing in between task force meetings.

All agenda items were supported by a presentation prepared by Elia. These slides serve as background for these minutes and are provided in annex.

It was indicated that for the part on market design there is also an annex to the presentation which provides further clarifications on the items discussed during the task force.

3. Approval of draft minutes TF ISR 17/2/2014 and practical arrangements website

- The draft minutes of the previous meeting of this task force (17/2/2014) were distributed by e-mail prior to this meeting. Two reactions were received (Anode and Febeg). Both reactions led to an amendment of the draft minutes. Both amendments have been presented, explained and approved. The minutes are approved by the Task Force and are considered as final. They will be distributed and published in due time.
- Elia informed the participants of the creation of a dedicated, public website of this task force where all relevant documents will be published. Publication timings for these documents were explained.

The website can be followed via the following link:

<http://www.elia.be/en/about-elia/Users-group/Strategic-Reserves-Implementation-Task-Force>

- The question was raised whether it is possible for stakeholders to provide a presentation during the task force meetings. It is confirmed that stakeholders are welcome to share their views by means of a presentation. They are however requested to inform the president and the secretary on time to ensure an efficient timing of the meetings and, for the sake of efficient content management, to make the presentations available prior to the meeting allowing Elia to take into account stakeholder view as soon as possible in its proposals.

4. Market design

During this part of the meeting Elia elaborated further on the Design that was presented during the previous Task Force. For each of the four steps (detection, notification, verification, injection & balancing) more information was provided.

The practical information was given that for each of the 4 steps 1 slide will be presented, but in the annex of the slideshow for each topic extra slides with extra information/clarification are added.

“Step 1 – Detection”

Both triggers (economic & technical) were explained:

- Economic trigger: Activation linked to Belgian curtailment in Belpex-DAM. It has priority over the technical trigger. If all available strategic reserve capacity is used via the economic trigger no capacity remains for the technical trigger. Strategic reserves will be activated via Elia, o.a. to avoid leakage to other countries.
- Technical trigger: Activation based on continuous monitoring of the system by the transmission system operator and could occur without an economic trigger.

The output of the detection phase is a required SR profile to be activated in the next phases.

The following questions and comments were made:

- *Question by Electrabel:* Electrabel stated that logically ARP's will nominate in balance and asked whether or not for the technical trigger Elia will perform its own load forecast?
Response by Elia: Elia explained that Elia will not only look at the programs but that all information available will be used for this evaluation, including its own forecasts.

- *Question by Electrabel:* Electrabel also asked if this approach is not in contradiction with the reactive market design for balancing?

Response by Elia: Elia explained that for this reason the design (see further) is made in such a way to avoid that strategic reserves would be activated too soon, and to maintain the incentives of a “reactive” market design.

The president also confirmed that for balancing, a “reactive” market design remains the goal, that limiting the impact on such market design is indeed one of the main challenges of the implementation of Strategic Reserves, however the nature of strategic reserves is such that we can't wait until 15 minutes before real-time to take decisions.

- *Question by T-power:* T-Power asked if there are sufficient volumes @ 3000 €/MWh then no Strategic Reserves would be activated? If so, then the 3000 €/MWh is irrelevant?

Response by Elia: Elia confirmed that in that case no SR would be activated. If Belpex would change the price-cap then the 3000 €/MWh for SR would change as well.

- *Question by Febeg:* Febeg asked if the technical trigger is continuously monitored?

Response by Elia: Elia confirmed that this will be monitored throughout the whole winter.

“Step 2 – Notification”

During the notification step Strategic Reserves are selected and notified:

- SR to be activated are selected for ‘warming up’. This selection will be based on a technical-economical evaluation because (beside the price) other constraints must be taken in to account, for example:
 - Spill over on the balancing market if for example 50MW would have to be activated and the cheapest power plan has a minim injection of 140MW... in that case it could be desirable to select a more expensive unit with a lower minimal injection.
 - Contractual constraints (max number of activations or duration)
 - Technical constraints
 - Etc...
- Elia notifies the selected SR and the market is informed.

The main output of the Notification phase is that the selected SR are requested to be ready into ‘hot’ conditions, this should significantly reduce further lead times.

The following questions and comments were made:

- *Question by EDF-Luminus:* If the monitoring starts in W-1, could Elia inform the market already 1 week in advance?

Response by Elia: It is explained that the earliest activation will take place via the economic trigger in Day Ahead. So Elia couldn't decide to activate SR sooner. Elia will monitor as from W-1 whether or not there could be a scarcity issue including Strategic reserves. If so, the scarcity plan could be launched, this is another procedure beyond strategic reserves.

- *Question by T-Power:* It is asked what would happen with the costs if ever a unit would be requested to warm-up but not started?

Response by Elia: It is explained that there will be a separate remuneration for that. These costs will be covered.

“Step 3 – Verification”

In this step the system gets closer to real-time and Elia has to decide whether or not strategic reserves have to inject:

- Elia verifies the anticipated need of SR, perhaps the conditions have changed, etc...
- Depending on the result of the verification, Elia instructs the notified SR to inject, ‘keep warm’ or stop.

The main output of the verification stage is that notified SR are confirmed to start injecting energy/reduce consumption.

No specific questions and comments were raised.

“Step 4 - Injection & Balancing”

In this step it's all about being balanced or not and what the potential consequence are.

Once verified, SR will be actually injecting and become visible in the control area's position. This impacts the balancing market. However, the aim is to limit the injection without counterpart (residual energy) ; in addition the imbalance pricing should be appropriate and reflect the real situation of the control area.

In order for the imbalance tariff to become administratively fixed at a very high price (this means significantly higher than the DAM activation price of 3000 €/MWh) two conditions have to be fulfilled:

1) SR must be injecting energy (either following a technical or economic trigger)

AND

2) There is “structural shortage”

- If both conditions are not met then the imbalance price will be calculated as if no Strategic Reserves were activated (=> price-effect of SR will be neutralized).
- “Structural shortage” is to be understood as the opposite of residual imbalance, the method to calculate this is still under construction but anyway this method should be simple and transparent. Most likely it will be linked to the remaining flexibility knowing that the ancillary service reserves contracted for Forced Outages and residual imbalances must remain available for residual imbalances and Forced Outages (Strategic Reserves could also face FO's)

The main result of the injection phase is that SR actually inject into the zone and influence the zone's position and that the balancing market reflects this appropriately.

Regarding this topic a lot of questions and remarks were raised by the stakeholders, as summarized below:

- *Question by T-power:* It was asked if the very high price is a consequence of the real-time situation or needed to make the system work? Stated differently: the 3000 €/MWh is not a prerequisite?
Response by Elia: It is explained that the risk of high prices is needed to give the proper incentives. If the price in real-time would never be higher than the price in day-ahead then the ARP's have no incentive to solve the problem in day-ahead, they would all prefer to wait real-time (and rely on the SR). Design wise a very high imbalance price in case both conditions are fulfilled is thus a pre-requisite for this system to work.
- *Question by Electrabel:* It was asked what would happen if in Day Ahead SR would be activated via Economic trigger but afterwards the situation would become better in intraday. Then prices in intraday could drop.
Response by Elia: It is explained that in that case not both conditions would be fulfilled and thus the imbalance price would be “normal”.
Reaction by Essent: It is argued that we could stop SR and/or buy cheaper on the intraday market.
Response by Elia: It is explained that this would be very tricky for several reasons linked to the design of the intraday market, potential effects across borders and price impacts.

- *Question by Ineos:* It is asked what happens during ramping up and ramping down of strategic reserves.
- *Response by Elia:* It is explained this would be absorbed (neutralized) via the balancing market without impacting the imbalance tariff. The imbalance tariff would be set in such way that they are not impacted by the strategic reserves.
- *Remark by EDF-Luminus:* It is pointed out that it could be that incremental bids that would have been activated by Elia are not activated because SR is injecting.
- *Response by Elia:* It is confirmed that this is true. The financial impact on the imbalance tariff (price-effect) of SR injecting can be neutralised but physically those SR are actually injecting and that (i.e. the volume-effect) can't be neutralized.

At the end there was also a long discussion on the principle to contract SR for the winter period whereas it's during the summer time that most gas-fired plants are stopped (and losing money). However, since this debate is out of the scope of the Taskforce for implementation of Strategic Reserves it was not continued.

5. Product design

Elia presented the main contours on product design. After first outlining some main principles for both products and why two different products are considered useful, both for SGR (Strategic Generation Reserves) and SDR (Strategic Demand Reserves) the product design is explained.

General product considerations

Elia outlined that products are intended for the winter period, i.e. 5 months from 1/11 until 31/3. By referring to the draft law amendment setting out obligations and rights for different parties and inherent differences to the demand and generation side of the market, Elia proposes two separate but complementary and comparable products.

These general considerations triggered many reactions by the participants, as summarized below:

- *Questions raised by several participants:* Is remuneration only received during five (winter) months or during twelve months?
Response by Elia: It is clarified that remuneration is only foreseen during the five winter months. Contract duration will depend on the decision on the volumes made by the Minister. Elia explained that in theory the contract could leave open the option to potentially discuss conditions for activating contracted strategic reserves outside the foreseen winter period. However, at this stage, this option is not further studied.
Remark by several participants: A 5-month remuneration period is not evident since labour costs and other (fixed) cost elements are often not obvious to be considered over such short period of time.
- *Remark by E.ON:* It is stated that one should not have the same expectations about similar units as they might be in a different state (e.g. not yet mothballed versus deeply mothballed). This also links back to the implementation planning, where only a two month period between contracts being awarded and go-live is very short and might not be realistic.
Elia takes note of this element.
- *Remark by Restore:* It is pointed out that the draft law amendment does not explicitly state that two different products (SDR and SGR) have to be created.
Response by Elia: This is correct. However, the law does not prevent it either and allows Elia to do so and to take into account technical differences.

- *Remark by Electrabel:* Electrabel shared its view that SDR should be contracted from load which is “out-of-market”, consumption being price-inelastic in the current market. Hence, to be considered out of market it should not already react on price signals.
Response by Elia: It was clarified that the SDR design aims to target out-of-market volumes in a sense compatible with the above description.
Remark by Restore: It is argued that volumes that are out-of-market at demand side inherently imply a Delta_P-philosophy on product design and therefore should be SGR-like. It was also argued that volumes which are today not active on Belpex and that are triggered at prices beyond 3000 €/MWh that should be targeted.
Response by Elia: It is argued that it is very important not to incite demand to consume in order to be available. In that sense a shedding limit-approach is very compatible with the problem to be solved, i.e. an adequacy problem. Demand which is not consuming directly reduces the needs for which strategic reserves are created from the start. The fact that targeted loads are not on Belpex, does not exclude the Shedding Limit approach to be useful.
- *Question by Restore:* Would two different products (delta_P and shedding limit) not be more appropriate?
- *Response by Elia:* It is not excluded that over time multiple products can co-exist, but for the first year this is practically not possible. Designs will have to be evaluated and can evolve over time.
- *Question by Ineos:* It was asked whether both products (SDR and SGR) are open for both generation and demand if they can meet the requirements?
Response by Elia: It is explained that this might be open for consideration in the future, but initially this is assessed as potentially counter-productive. It is repeated that the effect on adequacy from production and demand are not identical, hence the different products; meeting the requirements of the other product would not necessarily imply contributing to the objective. Designs will have to be evaluated and can evolve over time.
Remark by Essent and E.ON: It is argued that a production unit running for one day cannot be compared with an industrial process not running for one day.

It should be noted that several questions and reactions went beyond the scope of this task force: Different participants, mainly producers, commented on a perceived paradox in the draft law amendment focusing on winter products while in these periods market conditions are better than in summer, the role of the market and how strategic reserves influence this role, the long-term effects of strategic reserves on the investment climate and the position of generation units which are not ‘out-of-market’.

SGR: Strategic Generation Reserves

The main principles such as availability requirements, how availability is measured and characteristics such as delays for activation and remuneration principles are explained.

Elia pointed out that on slide 17 of the presentation a clerical error occurred: the third bullet point of the second section should be “Remuneration on a monthly basis: 1/5 of the winter period”.

The comments and questions received are summarized below:

- *Remark by T-Power:* It is argued that 5 months without maintenance is very difficult. The current design might give an incentive to take risks and declare false availability. This should be avoided.
Similar remark by E.ON and Electrabel: It is argued that the current state of power plants does not readily allow availability from 1 November onwards.

☞ **Request by Elia:** All participants are kindly invited to provide any useful information on planning requirements, both with respect to the potential deadline of being available from 1 November onwards as well as on reasonable maintenance planning requirements during the 5-month winter period.

- **Question by Electrabel:** Is the missing maintenance a sufficient reason for not participating in the tender?
Response by Elia: It should not be the purpose. Elia also indicated that the design already leaves some room for maintenance by limiting in time the penalty for unavailability, but Elia also acknowledges that the design should be improved on this point.
- **Remark by Electrabel:** It was suggested that conditions should be foreseen under which plants cannot participate to the tender.
A general discussion on when plants can return to the market was held among the participants.
Response by Elia: It is highlighted that this is in the first place is a legal issue beyond the scope of this task force. However, it is also clearly stated that within the contracted period a plant cannot be used beyond the scope of strategic reserves.

☞ **Request by Elia:** All participants are kindly invited to provide their feedback on the delays for warming up and ramping up/(down) linked to the notification and verification steps of the market design, as well as on the characteristics of a typical start profile. The current proposal is certainly open for calibration and improvement.

- **Reaction by EDF-Luminus:** On the above item, it was explained that for a CCGT injection of energy already occurs early in the start-up process. This is linked to the technical process of heating the boiler. This requires the gas turbines to run and therefore inject energy. For a particular CCGT this could already be 40 MW, which is still far below the Pmin of the entire CCGT. This renders the proposed delays by Elia not realistic or requires changes.
- **Remark by E.ON:** Pre-winter testing is very difficult for this year given the already short delays if contracted.

SDR: Strategic Demand Reserves

The main principles such as eligible providers (see also part on tender design), ICH-based approach, main characteristics to be fulfilled, remuneration principles, availability requirements, etc. are explained.

The comments and questions received are summarized below:

- **Question by Actility:** Is it possible to only provide a morning or evening product, i.e. a product that can only be activated during specific hours such as the morning or evening peak?
Related question by Ineos: Can SDR be activated outside typical peak hours?
Response by Elia: There is a preference to be able to cover with a single activation both the morning and evening peaks. It is however highlighted that the historical peak periods as shown in the presentation are only used for calibrating the product requirements. They do not imply that only in those hours SDR can be activated! Activation can occur at all times during the day.
Reaction by Restore: It is argued that from Restore's point of view there is at first sight no significant difference between morning or evening activation.
Reaction by BASF: In principle it is possible to have 30 activations over a winter period and even several consecutive activations. However, it is unlikely that 30 consecutive activations with each time the minimum delay between two activations is realistic for some industrial processes.

☞ **Request by Elia:** Elia indicated that for the first year only one SLA is preferred for practical reasons. Two initial proposals are made (duration – time in between two activations: 4-4 and 12-12),

but feedback is kindly requested from the participants on these proposals in particular with respect to the calibration of the different parameters: # activations, duration of activation, duration between two activations, delays linked to notification and verification.

- *Question by Electrabel:* What is the impact of the availability check on SDR?
Answer by Elia: The primary effect is that the SDR provider does not receive remuneration for these 15 minute periods of unavailability. Additionally, Elia strongly emphasized the role of the certification process. This also links to the aim of targeting new, but credible flexibility.
- *Question by Febeg:* Doesn't providing such a remuneration structure result in subsidizing the demand side with as a consequence that they can become active on markets like Belpex and in the end nothing tangible as strategic reserve?
Response by Ineos: It is highlighted that even demand would become more flexible and start participating more on Belpex, the remuneration via strategic reserves still creates the guarantee that – when requested – demand would go below its shedding limit. Hence, there is still an added value.
Response by Elia: Elia confirms the response of Ineos and adds that the targeted demand volumes are to be found among not yet exploited flexible assets, thus among demand assets from which profile is not correlated to the BPX market.
- *Question by Restore:* Is the Rref an average?
Response by Elia: This is linked to the certification process. Although this has to be determined in more detail yet, it is clear that a strict average is likely to be insufficient.
- *Question by BASF:* Is settlement of Rref intended to be based on Elia-metering?
Response by Elia: Yes, at least for the first year.
- *Question by EDF-Luminus:* The quality of nominations as baseline is questioned. Is there not an incentive to overnominate?
Response by Elia: To the extent the incentive exists, there is monitoring foreseen on this issue which can impact eligibility for next years' participation.
- *Question by EDF-Luminus:* Isn't the penalty factor ($1 \times \text{remuneration} / \text{missing MWh}$) during an activation too low if SDR does not drop until the shedding limit?
Response by Elia: No, this is not foreseen as it is assumed that the SDR provider has made significant costs anyway. It is acknowledged, that there are no firm guarantees for this.
- *General question by Enel:* Why do parameters have to be fixed prior to the tender? Why can they not be evaluated as result of the tender?
Response by Elia: This would seriously complicate the tender selection process as it is very complex to value and rank different combinations of parameters against each other. It is, however, stated by Elia that providers that can outperform the parameters should not necessarily be limited in real-time to perform as the parameters prescribe.

6. Tender design

Elia presented the modalities for tender participation, the tender process and calendar, eligibility criteria for both SDR and SGR, the elements in the call for tender, terms of reference and technical specifications and selection and award criteria.

☞ **Request by Elia:** Elia is currently working on the SDR certification criteria and procedure. Participants are invited to provide their suggestions, in particular with respect to proving the reference power.

☞ **Request by Elia:** All producers will be requested at a later moment in time – upon formal request by Elia once the draft law amendment has passed Parliament – to indicate according to their view

which production units are (and are not) considered eligible (and hence obliged) to participate in the tender and why (or why not).

- *Question by T-Power:* Is the duration (i.e. number of winters) already fixed?
Response by Elia: No, this will depend on the decision on the volumes and duration, to be made by the Minister.
- *Question by EDF-Luminus:* Will tests be remunerated and if yes, how?
Response by Elia: Tests upon request by Elia will be remunerated according to the costs agreed in the contract. It is assumed that the same activation costs, variable costs etc. apply on a test situation as they do on a normal activation.
- *General request by market participants:* It is requested to receive more information on the testing planning within and before winter.
Response by Elia: More information will be provided. Note however that tests within the contracting period are meant not to be announced.
- *Question by Ineos:* Is it not a pity to put a maximum on the SDR volume if it turns out to be competitive with SGR in terms of price?
Response by Elia: This is an element to be evaluated over years, but given the fact that SGR and SDR are not fully comparable (e.g. SDR has a limited number of activations) and the caution required with respect to possible cannibalisation of other demand side products, such a maximum is proposed.
- *Remark by E.ON:* It is stated that some parties are not interested in being selected as strategic reserves, even when obliged to participate in the tender.
Response by Elia: The remark is noted, but if contracted it is expected that terms of contract are respected and fulfilled.
- *Question by several producers:* Is the variable price asked for in the tender a fixed number or can it be a price formula? Reference is made to the limited hedging possibilities and the variability in terms of gas and carbon prices.
Response by Elia: The initial proposal is indeed fixed price to be stated in the tender in order to increase comparability in the selection process. If this is considered unfeasible or resulting almost certainly in very high prices (due to price risk management), than other options should indeed be considered.
- *Question by EDF-Luminus:* Is the same formula to evaluate SDR and SGR offers used for both SDR and SGR or are different formulas applied?
Response by Elia: The same formula with the same parameters and calibration will be applied to ensure competition.
- *Question by EDF-Luminus:* Is the competition between SDR and SGR not jeopardized by setting a minimum and maximum on SDR volume? In particular, can this be detrimental to SGR selection (which can exhibit lumpy volumes due to indivisibilities)?
Response by Elia: The minimum and maximum volume for SDR is set prior to the tender. Competition between both products can take place for the volume between those limits. It is noted that at least the volume decided by the minister is to be selected. However, indivisibilities in offers could imply that a higher volume is selected as long as overall the most cost efficient selection is made. Finally, it is highlighted that the call for tender will include the question whether the offer made is divisible or not, this will of course be taken into account by Elia in the selection process.
- *Question by EDF-Luminus:* What if offers over several years have to be compared?
Response by Elia: For SDR only one year products are envisaged at this stage. For SGR this can only be addressed once the minister has taken its volume decision.

7. Closing

The president summarized which elements have to be discussed during the next TF meetings based on the discussions during this meeting:

- The criterion for structural shortage and the imbalance pricing itself;
- Certification criteria;
- Adapted product design based on comments received with respect to maintenance and parameter calibration
- Min and max for SDR, subject to the volume decision to be taken by the minister

It is emphasized that feedback on all items discussed is encouraged between this and the following meeting, in particular on those items where during the meeting Elia explicitly called for input/feedback (see also chapter 8 of these minutes).

8. Summary of specific information requests by Elia.

This chapter lists the topics for which feedback from the market participants is kindly requested by Elia.

- ☞ All participants are invited to provide any useful information on planning requirements, both with respect to the potential deadline of being available from 1 November onwards as well as on likely maintenance requirements during the 5-month winter period.
- ☞ All participants are invited to provide their feedback on the delays for warming up and ramping up/(down) linked to the notification and verification steps of the market design as well as on the characteristics of atypical start profile. The current proposal is certainly open for calibration and improvement.
- ☞ Elia indicated that for the first year only one SLA is preferred for practical reasons. Two initial proposals are made (duration – time in between two activations: 4-4 and 12-12), but feedback is kindly requested from the participants on these proposals in particular with respect to the calibration of the different parameters: # activations, duration of activation, duration between two activations, delays linked to notification and verification.
- ☞ Participants are invited to provide their suggestions on certification of SDR, in particular with respect to proving the reference power.
- ☞ All producers will be requested at a later moment in time – upon formal request by Elia once the draft law amendment has passed Parliament – to indicate according to their view which production units are (and are not) considered eligible (and hence obliged) to participate in the tender and why (or why not).

This does not limit the possibility to provide feedback on items not listed above!

9. Meeting calendar

The next meetings are:

Date	Time	Location
Wednesday 19/3/2014	9.00-13.00	Elia Emperor
Wednesday 16/4/2014	9.00-13.00	Elia Emperor

10. Annex: Elia-presentation



The Elia-presentation can also be found [online](#).

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